October 23rd, 2006 by Chandler Howell

From an article on Diebold and Sequoia voting machines and Edward Felton’s efforts to challenge the problems:

Want to shake confidence in democracy? All you need, according to the Princeton team, is some common programming skills, a key widely available for $2, and a moment alone with an unattended machine.

Unlock a lid, briefly insert a memory card infected with The Virus, and the machine is ready to infect other Diebold machines that get programmed by shared cards.

The virus can be designed to fool pre-election testers. It can awaken on some future election day. And it can destroy itself afterward. In mock elections conducted by the Princeton team, no matter how the votes were cast, Benedict Arnold beat George Washington every time on an infected machine, with no evidence of his treachery left behind.

Computer scientists have sounded the loudest warnings about electronic voting machines, which have been dogged by anecdotal reports of vote-switching and other glitches. Because so little is known about the inner workings of these devices, critics say, it’s virtually impossible to detect errors or sabotage.

Manufacturers’ political ties have not inspired trust. Walden O’Dell, for example, raised money for President Bush in 2004 while serving as Diebold’s chief executive.

What I find most despicable about this is that Diebold, manufacturer of horribly insecure voting machines is the same company as Diebold, major manufacturer of rock-solid ATM machines. This selective incompetence indicates to me that Diebold cares about money, but not democracy.

- Posted in Security and Risk Management

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